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Abstract. In software-defined networks (SDN), a controller program is
in charge of deploying diverse network functionality across a large number
of switches, but this comes at a great risk: deploying buggy controller code
could result in network and service disruption and security loopholes. The
automatic detection of bugs or, even better, verification of their absence
is thus most desirable, yet the size of the network and the complexity
of the controller makes this a challenging undertaking. In this paper we
propose MOCS, a highly expressive, optimised SDN model that allows
capturing subtle real-world bugs, in a reasonable amount of time. This is
achieved by (1) analysing the model for possible partial order reductions,
(2) statically pre-computing packet equivalence classes and (3) indexing
packets and rules that exist in the model. We demonstrate its superiority
compared to the state of the art in terms of expressivity, by providing
examples of realistic bugs that a prototype implementation of MOCS
in Uppaal caught, and performance/scalability, by running examples on
various sizes of network topologies, highlighting the importance of our
abstractions and optimisations.
1 Introduction
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [37,36] has brought about a paradigm shift
in designing and operating computer networks. A logically centralised controller
implements the control logic and ‘programs’ the data plane, which is defined by
flow tables installed in network switches. SDN enables the rapid development
of advanced and diverse network functionality; e.g. in designing next-generation
inter-data centre traffic engineering [10], load balancing [18], firewalls [23], and
Internet exchange points (IXPs) [15]. SDN has gained noticeable ground in the
industry, with major vendors integrating OpenFlow [35], the de-facto SDN stan-
dard maintained by the Open Networking Forum, in their products. Operators
deploy it at scale [26,38]. SDN presents a unique opportunity for innovation and
rapid development of complex network services by enabling all players, not just
vendors, to develop and deploy control and data plane functionality in networks.
This comes at a great risk; deploying buggy code at the controller could result
in problematic flow entries at the data plane and, potentially, service disrup-
tion [13,17,49,47] and security loopholes [25,7]. Understanding and fixing such
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bugs is far from trivial, given the distributed and concurrent nature of computer
networks and the complexity of the control plane [44].
With the advent of SDN, a large body of research on verifying network prop-
erties has emerged [31]. Static network analysis approaches [32,29,51,2,45,11] can
only verify network properties on a given fixed network configuration but this
may be changing very quickly (e.g. as in [1]). Another key limitation is the fact
that they cannot reason about the controller program, which, itself, is responsi-
ble for the changes in the network configuration. Dynamic approaches, such as
[30,40,50,22,28,48], are able to reason about network properties as changes hap-
pen (i.e. as flow entries in switches’ flow tables are being added and deleted),
but they cannot reason about the controller program either. As a result, when a
property violation is detected, there is no straightforward way to fix the bug in
the controller code, as these systems are oblivious of the running code. Identifying
bugs in large and complex deployments can be extremely challenging.
Formal verification methods that include the controller code in the model of
the network can solve this important problem. Symbolic execution methods, such
as [46,8,11,27,14,5,12], evaluate programs using symbolic variables accumulating
path-conditions along the way that then can be solved logically. However, they
suffer from the path explosion problem caused by loops and function calls which
means verification does not scale to larger controller programs (bug finding still
works but is limited). Model checking SDNs is a promising area even though only
few studies have been undertaken [27,3,8,43,33,34]. Networks and controller can
be naturally modelled as transition systems. State explosion is always a problem
but can be mitigated by using abstraction and optimisation techniques (i.e. par-
tial order reductions). At the same time, modern model checkers [20,6,9,24,19]
are very efficient.
netsmc [27] uses a bespoke symbolic model checking algorithm for checking
properties given a subset of computation tree logic that allows quantification
only over all paths. As a result, this approach scales relatively well, but the re-
quirement that only one packet can travel through the network at any time is
very restrictive and ignores race conditions. nice [8] employs model checking
but only looks at a limited amount of input packets that are extracted through
symbolically executing the controller code. As a result, it is a bug-finding tool
only. The authors in [43] propose a model checking approach that can deal with
dynamic controller updates and an arbitrary number of packets but require man-
ually inserted non-interference lemmas that constrain the set of packets that
can appear in the network. This significantly limits its applicability in realistic
network deployments. Kuai [33] overcomes this limitation by introducing model-
specific partial order reductions (PORs) that result in pruning the state space
by avoiding redundant explorations. However, it has limitations explained at the
end of this section.
In this paper, we take a step further towards the full realisation of model
checking real-world SDNs, by introducing MOCS (MOdel Checking for Soft-
ware defined networks)1, a highly expressive, optimised SDN model which we
1 A release of MOCS is publicly available at https://tinyurl.com/y95qtv5k
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implemented in Uppaal2 [6]. MOCS, compared to the state of the art in model
checking SDNs, can model network behaviour more realistically and verify larger
deployments using fewer resources. The main contributions of this paper are:
Model Generality. The proposed network model is closer to the OpenFlow
standard than previous models (e.g. [33]) to reflect commonly exhibited behaviour
between the controller and network switches. More specifically, it allows for race
conditions between control messages and includes a significant number of Open-
Flow interactions, including barrier response messages. In our experimentation
section, we present families of elusive bugs that can be efficiently captured by
MOCS.
Model Checking Optimisations. To tackle the state explosion problem we
propose context-dependent partial order reductions by considering the concrete
control program and specification in question. We establish the soundness of the
proposed optimisations. Moreover, we propose state representation optimisations,
namely packet and rule indexing, identification of packet equivalence classes and
bit packing, to improve performance. We evaluate the benefits from all proposed
optimisations in §4.
Our model has been inspired by Kuai [33]. According to the contributions
above, however, we consider MOCS to be a considerable improvement. We model
more OpenFlow messages and interactions, enabling us to check for bugs that
[33] cannot even express (see discussion in §4.2). Our context-dependent PORs
systematically explore possibilities for optimisation. Our optimisation techniques
still allow MOCS to run at least as efficiently as Kuai, often with even better
performance.
2 Software-Defined Network Model
A key objective of our work is to enable the verification of network-wide proper-
ties in real-world SDNs. In order to fulfil this ambition, we present an extended
network model to capture complex interactions between the SDN controller and
the network. Below we describe the adopted network model, its state and tran-
sitions.
2.1 Formal Model Definition
The formal definition of the proposed SDN model is by means of an action-
deterministic transition system. We parameterise the model by the underlying
network topology, λ, and the controller program, cp, in use, as explained further
below (§2.2).
Definition 1. An SDN model is a 6-tuple Mpλ,cpq “ pS, s0, A, ãÑ, AP, Lq, where
S is the set of all states the SDN may enter, s0 the initial state, A the set of
2 Uppaal has been chosen as future plans include extending the model to timed actions
like e.g. timeouts. Note that the model can be implemented in any model checker.
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actions which encode the events the network may engage in, ãÑĎ S ˆ A ˆ S
the transition relation describing which execution steps the system undergoes as
it perform actions, AP a set of atomic propositions describing relevant state
properties, and L : S Ñ 2AP is a labelling function, which relates to any state s P
S a set Lpsq P 2AP of those atomic propositions that are true for s. Such an SDN
model is composed of several smaller systems, which model network components
(hosts, switches and the controller) that communicate via queues and, combined,
give rise to the definition of ãÑ. The states of an SDN transition system are
3-tuples ppi, δ, γq where pi represents the state of each host, δ the state of each
switch, and γ the controller state. The components are explained in §2.2 and the
transitions ãÑ in §2.3.
Figure 1 illustrates a high-level view of OpenFlow interactions (left side),
modelled actions and queues (right side).
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Fig. 1: A high-level view of OpenFlow interactions using OpenFlow specifi-
cation terminology (left half) and the modelled actions (right half). A red
solid-line arrow depicts an action which, when fired, (1) dequeues an item from
the queue the arrow begins at, and (2) adds an item in the queue the arrow-
head points to (or multiple items if the arrow is double-headed). Deleting an
item from the target queue is denoted by a reverse arrowhead. A forked arrow
denotes multiple targeted queues.
2.2 SDN Model Components
Throughout we will use the common “dot notation”, . , to refer to components of
composite gadgets (tuples), e.g. queues of switches, or parts of the state. We use
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obvious names for the projections functions like s.pi.sw.pq for the packet queue
of the switch sw in state s. At times we will also use t1 and t2 for the first and
second projection of tuple t.
Network Topology. A location pn, ptq is a pair of a node (host or switch)
n and a port pt. We describe the network topology as a bijective function λ :
pSwitchesYHostsqˆPortsÑ pSwitchesYHostsqˆPorts consisting of a set of
directed edges xpn, ptq, pn1, pt1qy where pt1 is the input port of the switch or host n1
that is connected to port pt at host or switch n. Hosts, Switches and Ports are
the (finite) sets of all hosts, switches and ports in the network, respectively. The
topology function is used when a packet needs to be forwarded in the network.
The location of the next hop node is decided when a send, match or fwd action
(all defined further below) is fired. Every SDN model is w.r.t. a fixed topology λ
that does not change.
Packets. Packets are modelled as finite bit vectors and transferred in the network
by being stored to the queues of the various network components. A packet P
Packets (the set of all packets that can appear in the network) contains bits
describing the proof-relevant header information and its location loc.
Hosts. Each host P Hosts, has a packet queue (rcvq) and a finite set of ports
which are connected to ports of other switches. A host can send a packet to
one or more switches it is connected to (send action in Figure 1) or receive a
packet from its own rcvq (recv action in Figure 1). Sending occurs repeatedly in
a non-deterministic fashion which we model implicitly via the p0,8q abstraction
at switches’ packet queues, as discussed further below.
Switches. Each switch P Switches, has a flow table (ft), a packet queue (pq),
a control queue (cq), a forwarding queue (fq) and one or more ports, through
which it is connected to other switches and/or hosts. A flow table ft Ď Rules is
a set of forwarding rules (with Rules being the set of all rules). Each one consists
of a tuple ppriority, pattern, portsq, where priority P N determines the priority
of the rule over others, pattern is a proposition over the proof-relevant header of
a packet, and ports is a subset of the switch’s ports. Switches match packets in
their packet queues against rules (i.e. their respective pattern) in their flow table
(match action in Figure 1) and forward packets to a connected device (or final
destination), accordingly. Packets that cannot be matched to any rule are sent to
the controller’s request queue (rq) (nomatch action in Figure 1); in OpenFlow,
this is done by sending a PacketIn message. The forwarding queue fq stores
packets forwarded by the controller in PacketOut messages. The control queue
stores messages sent by the controller in FlowMod and BarrierReq messages.
FlowMod messages contain instructions to add or delete rules from the flow table
(that trigger add and del actions in Figure 1). BarrierReq messages contain
barriers to synchronise the addition and removal of rules. MOCS conforms to
the OpenFlow specifications and always execute instructions in an interleaved
fashion obeying the ordering constraints imposed by barriers.
OpenFlow Controller. The controller is modelled as a finite state automaton
embedded into the overall transition system. A controller program cp, as used
to parametrise an SDN model, consists of pCS, pktIn, barrierInq. It uses its own
local state cs P CS where CS is the finite set of control program states. Incoming
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PacketIn and BarrierRes messages from the SDN model are stored in separate
queues (rq and brq, respectively) and trigger ctrl or bsync actions (see Figure 1)
which are then processed by the controller program in its current state. The
controller’s corresponding handler, pktIn for PacketIn messages and barrierIn for
BarrierRes messages, responds by potentially changing its local state and sending
messages to a subset of Switches, as follows. A number of PacketOut messages
(pairs of (pkt, ports)) can be sent to a subset of Switches. Such a message is stored
in a switch’s forward queue and instructs it to forward packet pkt along the ports
ports. The controller may also send any number of FlowMod and BarrierReq
messages to the control queue of any subset of Switches. A FlowMod message may
contain an add or delete rule modification instruction. These are executed in an
arbitrary order by switches, and barriers are used to synchronise their execution.
Barriers are sent by the controller in BarrierReq messages. OpenFlow requires
that a response message (BarrierRes) is sent to the controller by a switch when a
barrier is consumed from its control queue so that the controller can synchronise
subsequent actions. Our model includes a brepl action that models the sending
of a BarrierRes message from a switch to the controller’s barrier reply queue
(brq), and a bsync action that enables the controller program to react to barrier
responses.
Queues. All queues in the network are modelled as finite state. Packet queues pq
for switches are modelled as multisets, and we adopt p0,8q abstraction [41]; i.e.
a packet is assumed to appear either zero or an arbitrary (unbounded) amount
of times in the respective multiset. This means that once a packet has arrived
at a switch or host, (infinitely) many other packets of the same kind repeatedly
arrive at this switch or host. Switches’ forwarding queues fq are, by contrast,
modelled as sets, therefore if multiple identical packets are sent by the controller
to a switch, only one will be stored in the queue and eventually forwarded by
the switch. The controller’s request rq and barrier reply queues brq are modelled
as sets as well. Hosts’ receive queues rcvq are also modelled as sets. Controller
queues cq at switches are modelled as a finite sequence of sets of control messages
(representing add and remove rule instructions), interleaved by any number of
barriers. As the numbers of barriers that can appear at any execution is finite,
this sequence is finite.
2.3 Guarded Transitions
Here we provide a detailed breakdown of the transition relation s
αpaqãÝÝÝÑ s1 for
each action αpaq P Apsq, where Apsq the set of all enabled actions in s in the
proposed model (see Figure 1). Transitions are labelled by action names α with
arguments a. The transitions are only enabled in state s if s satisfies certain
conditions called guards that can refer to the arguments a. In guards, we make
use of predicate bestmatchpsw, r, pktq that expresses that r is the highest priority
rule in sw.ft that matches pkt’s header. Below we list all possible actions with
their respective guards.
sendph, pt, pktq. Guard: true. This transition models packets arriving in the
network in a non-deterministic fashion. When it is executed, pkt is added to
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the packet queue of the network switch connected to the port pt of host h (or,
formally, to λph, ptq1.pq, where λ is the topology function described above). As
described in §3.2, only relevant representatives of packets are actually sent by
end-hosts. This transition is unguarded, therefore it is always enabled.
recvph, pktq. Guard: pkt P h.rcvq. This transition models hosts receiving (and
removing) packets from the network and is enabled if pkt is in h’s receive queue.
matchpsw, pkt, rq. Guard: pkt P sw.pq^r P sw.ft^bestmatchpsw, r, pktq. This
transition models matching and forwarding packet pkt to zero or more next hop
nodes (hosts and switches), as a result of highest priority matching of rule r with
pkt. The packet is then copied to the packet queues of the connected hosts and/or
switches, by applying the topology function to the port numbers in the matched
rule; i.e. λpsw, ptq1.pq,@pt P r.ports. Dropping packets is modelled by having a
special ‘drop’ port that can be included in rules. The location of the forwarded
packet(s) is updated with the respective destination (switch/host, port) pair; i.e.
λpsw, ptq. Due to the p0,8q abstraction, the packet is not removed from sw.pq.
nomatchpsw, pktq. Guard: pkt P sw.pq ^ Er P sw.ft . bestmatchpsw, r, pktq.
This transition models forwarding a packet to the OpenFlow controller when a
switch does not have a rule in its forwarding table that can be matched against
the packet header. In this case, pkt is added to rq for processing. pkt is not
removed from sw.pq due to the supported p0,8q abstraction.
ctrlpsw, pkt, csq. Guard: pkt P controller .rq. This transition models the exe-
cution of the packet handler by the controller when packet pkt that was pre-
viously sent by sw is available in rq. The controller’s packet handler function
pktInpsw, pkt, csq is executed which, in turn (i) reads the current controller state
cs and changes it according to the controller program, (ii) adds a number of rules,
interleaved with any number of barriers, into the cq of zero or more switches, and
(iii) adds zero or more forwarding messages, each one including a packet along
with a set of ports to the fq of zero or more switches.
fwdpsw, pkt, portsq. Guard: ppkt, portsq P sw.fq. This transition models for-
warding packet pkt that was previously sent by the controller to sw’s forwarding
queue sw.fq. In this case, pkt is removed from sw.fq (which is modelled as a
set), and added to the pq of a number of network nodes (switches and/or hosts),
as defined by the topology function λpsw, ptq1.pq,@pt P ports. The location of
the forwarded packet(s) is updated with the respective destination (switch/host,
port) pair; i.e. λpn, ptq.
FMpsw, rq where FM P tadd , delu. Guard: pFM, rq P headpsw.cqq. These tran-
sitions model the addition and deletion, respectively, of a rule in the flow table of
switch sw. They are enabled when one or more add and del control messages are
in the set at the head of the switch’s control queue. In this case r is added to –
or deleted from, respectively – sw.ft and the control message is deleted from the
set at the head of cq. If the set at the head of cq becomes empty it is removed.
If then the next item in cq is a barrier, a brepl transition becomes enabled (see
below).
breplpsw, xidq. Guard: bpxidq “ headpsw.cqq. This transition models a switch
sending a barrier response message, upon consuming a barrier from the head of its
control queue; i.e. if bpxidq is the head of sw.cq, where xid P N is an identifier for
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the barrier set by the controller, bpxidq is removed and the barrier reply message
brpsw, xidq is added to the controller’s brq.
bsyncpsw, xid, csq. Guard: brpsw, xidq P controller .brq. This transition models
the execution of the barrier response handler by the controller when a barrier
response sent by switch sw is available in brq. In this case, brpsw, xidq is removed
from the brq, and the controller’s barrier handler barrierIn(sw,xid,cs) is executed
which, in turn (i) reads the current controller state cs and changes it according to
the controller program, (ii) adds a number of rules, interleaved with any number
of barriers, into the cq of zero or more switches, and (iii) adds zero or more
forwarding messages, each one including a packet along with a set of ports to the
fq of zero or more switches.
An example run. In Figure 2, we illustrate a sequence of MOCS transitions
through a simple packet forwarding example. The run starts with a send tran-
sition; packet p is copied to the packet queue of the switch in black. Initially,
switches’ flow tables are empty, therefore p is copied to the controller’s request
queue (nomatch transition); note that p remains in the packet queue of the
switch in black due to the p0,8q abstraction. The controller’s packet handler is
then called (ctrl transition) and, as a result, (1) p is copied to the forwarding
queue of the switch in black, (2) rule r1 is copied to the control queue of the
switch in black, and (3) rule r2 is copied to the control queue of the switch in
white. Then, the switch in black forwards p to the packet queue of the switch
in white (fwd transition). The switch in white installs r2 in its flow table (add
transition) and then matches p with the newly installed rule and forwards it to
the receive queue of the host in white (match transition), which removes it from
the network (recv transition).
2.4 Specification Language
In order to specify properties of packet flow in the network, we use LTL formulas
without “next-step” operator ©3 where atomic formulae denoting properties of
states of the transition system, i.e. SDN network. In the case of safety properties,
i.e. an invariant w.r.t. states, the LTLzt©u formula is of the form 2ϕ, i.e. has
only an outermost 2 temporal connective.
Let P denote unary predicates on packets which encode a property of a packet
based on its fields. An atomic state condition (proposition) in AP is either of
the following: (i) existence of a packet pkt located in a packet queue (pq) of
a switch or in a receive queue (rcvq) of a host that satisfies P. We denote this
DpktPn.pq .Pppktq where n P Switches and DpktPh.rcvq .Pppktq where h P Hosts;4
(ii) the controller is in a specific controller state q P CS, denoted by a unary
predicate symbol Qpqq which holds in system state s P S if q “ s.γ.cs. The spec-
ification logic comprises first-order formula with equality on the finite domains
3 This is the largest set of formulae supporting the partial order reductions used in §3
as stutter equivalence does not preserve the truth value of formulae with the ©.
4 Note that these are atomic propositions despite the use of the existential quantifier
notation.
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of switches, hosts, rule priorities, and ports which are state-independent (and
decidable).
For example, DpktPsw.pq .Pppktq represents the fact that the packet predicate
P( ) is true for at least one packet pkt in the pq of switch sw. For every atomic
packet proposition Pppktq, also its negation  Pppktq is an atomic proposition
for the reason of simplifying syntactic checks of formulae in Table 1 in the next
section. Note that universal quantification over packets in a queue is a derived
notion. For instance, @pktPn.pq .Pppktq can be expressed as EpkPn.pq . Pppktq.
Universal and existential quantification over switches or hosts can be expressed
by finite iterations of ^ and _, respectively.
In order to be able to express that a condition holds when a certain event
happened, we add to our propositions instances of propositional dynamic logic
[42,16]. Given an action αp¨q P A and a proposition P that may refer to any
variables in x, rαpxqsP is also a proposition and rαpxqsP is true if, and only if,
after firing transition αpaq (to get to the current state), P holds with the variables
in x bound to the corresponding values in the actual arguments a. With the help
of those basic modalities one can then also specify that more complex events
occurred. For instance, dropping of a packet due to a match or fwd action can
be expressed by rmatchpsw, pkt, rqspr.fwd port “ dropq_rfwdpsw, pkt, ptqsppt “
dropq. Such predicates derived from modalities are used in §B-CP5.
The meaning of temporal LTL operators is standard depending on the trace
of a transition sequence s0
α1ãÝÑ s1 α2ãÝÑ . . .. The trace Lps0qLps1q . . . Lpsiq . . . is
defined as usual. For instance, trace Lps0qLps1qLps2q . . . satisfies invariant 2ϕ if
each Lpsiq implies ϕ.
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3 Model Checking
In order to verify desired properties of an SDN we use its model as described in
Def. 1 and apply model checking. In the following we propose optimisations that
significantly improve the performance of model checking.
3.1 Contextual Partial-Order Reduction
Partial order reduction (POR) [39] reduces the number of interleavings (traces)
one has to check. Here is a reminder of the main result (see [4]) where we use a
stronger condition than the regular (C4 ) to deal with cycles:
Theorem 1 (Correctness of POR). Given a finite transition system M “
pS,A, ãÑ, s0, AP, Lq that is action-deterministic and without terminal states, let
Apsq denote the set of actions in A enabled in state s P S. Let amplepsq Ď Apsq
be a set of actions for a state s P S that satisfies the following conditions:
C1 (Non)emptiness condition: ∅ ‰ amplepsq Ď Apsq.
C2 Dependency condition: Let s
α1ãÝÑ s1... αnãÝÑ sn βãÝÑ t be a run in M. If β P
Azamplepsq depends on amplepsq, then αi P amplepsq for some 0 ă i ď n,
which means that in every path fragment of M, β cannot appear before some
transition from amplepsq is executed.
C3 Invisibility condition: If amplepsq ‰ Apsq (i.e., state s is not fully expanded),
then every α P amplepsq is invisible.
C4 Every cycle in M contains a fully expanded state s (i.e. amplepsq “ Apsq).
Define the new, optimised, model Mample “ pSa, A, ãÑ , s0, AP, Laq as follows:
let Sa Ď S be the set of states reachable from the initial state s0 under ãÑ , let
Lapsq “ Lpsq for all s P Sa and define ãÑ Ď Sa ˆAˆ Sa inductively by the rule
s
αãÝÑ s1
s
αãÑ s1 if α P amplepsq
If amplepsq satisfies conditions (C1)-(C4) as outlined above, then for each path in
M there exists a stutter-trace equivalent path inMample , and vice-versa, denoted
M st”Mample .
The intuitive reason for this theorem to hold is the following: Assume an
action sequence αi...αi`nβ that reaches the state s, and β is independent of
tαi, ...αi`nu. Then, one can permute β with αi`n through αi successively n times.
One can therefore construct the sequence βαi...αi`n that also reaches the state s.
If this shift of β does not affect the labelling of the states with atomic propositions
(β is called invisible in this case), then it is not detectable by the property to
be shown and the permuted and the original sequence are equivalent w.r.t. the
property and thus don’t have to be checked both. One must, however, ensure,
that in case of loops (infinite execution traces) the ample sets do not preclude
some actions to be fired altogether, which is why one needs (C4 ).
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The more actions that are both stutter and provably independent (also re-
ferred to as safe actions [21]) there are, the smaller the transition system, and the
more efficient the model checking. One of our contributions is that we attempt to
identify as many safe actions as possible to make PORs more widely applicable
to our model.
The PORs in [33] consider only dependency and invisibility of recv and barrier
actions, whereas we explore systematically all possibilities for applications of
Theorem 1 to reduce the search space. When identifying safe actions, we consider
(1) the actual controller program cp, (2) the topology λ and (3) the state formula
ϕ to be shown invariant, which we call the context ctx of actions. It turns
out that two actions may be dependent in a given context of abstraction while
independent in another context, and similarly for invisibility, and we exploit this
fact. The argument of the action thus becomes relevant as well.
Definition 2 (Safe Actions). Given a context ctx “ pcp, λ, ϕq, and SDN
model Mpλ,cpq “ pS,A, ãÑ, s0, AP, Lq, an action αp¨q P Apsq is called ‘safe’ if it
is independent of any other action in A and invisible for ϕ. We write safe actions
αˇp¨q.
Definition 3 (Order-sensitive Controller Program). A controller program
cp is order-sensitive if there exists a state s P S and two actions α, β in
tctrlp¨q, bsyncp¨qu such that α, β P Apsq and s αãÝÑ s1 βãÝÑ s2 and s βãÝÑ s3 αãÝÑ s4
with s2 ‰ s4.
Definition 4. Let ϕ be a state formula. An action α P A is called ‘ϕ-invariant’
if s |ù ϕ iff αpsq |ù ϕ for all s P S with α P Apsq.
Lemma 1. For transition system Mpλ,cpq “ pS,A, ãÑ, s0, AP, Lq and a formula
ϕ P LTLzt©u, α P A is safe iff Ź3i“1 Safeipαq where Safei are given in Table 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Table 1: Safeness Predicates
Action Independence Invisibility
Safe1pαq Safe2pαq Safe3pαq
α “ ctrlpsw, pk, csq cp is not order-sensitive if Qpqq occurs in ϕ, where q P CS, then
α is ϕ-invariant.
α “ bsyncpsw, xid, csq cp is not order-sensitive if Qpqq occurs in ϕ, where q P CS, then
α is ϕ-invariant.
α “ fwdpsw, pk, portsq J
if DpkPb.q .Pppkq occurs in ϕ, for any
b P tswu Y tλpsw, pq1 | p P portsu and
q P tpq, recvqu, then α is ϕ-invariant.
α “ breplpsw, xidq J J
α “ recvph, pkq J if DpkPh.rcvq .Pppkq occurs in ϕ, then
α is ϕ-invariant.
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Theorem 2 (POR instance for SDN). Let pcp, λ, ϕq be a context such that
Mpλ,cpq “ pS,A, ãÑ, s0, AP, Lq is an SDN network model from Def. 1; and let
safe actions be as in Def. 2. Further, let amplepsq be defined by:
amplepsq “
" tα P Apsq | α safe u if tα P Apsq | α safe u ‰ H
Apsq otherwise
Then, ample satisfies the criteria of Theorem 1 and thus Mpλ,cpq st”Mamplepλ,cpq.
Proof.
C1 The (non)emptiness condition is trivial since by definition of amplepsq it
follows that amplepsq “ ∅ iff Apsq “ ∅.
C2 By assumption β P Azamplepsq depends on amplepsq. But with our definition
of amplepsq this is impossible as all actions in amplepsq are safe and by
definition independent of all other actions.
C3 The validity of the invisibility condition is by definition of ample and safe
actions.
C4 We now show that every cycle in Mamplepλ,cpq contains a fully expanded state s,
i.e. a state s such that amplepsq “ Apsq. By definition of amplepsq in Thm. 2
it is equivalent to show that there is no cycle in Mamplepλ,cpq consisting of safe
actions only. We show this by contradiction, assuming such a cycle of only
safe actions exists. There are five safe action types to consider: ctrl, fwd, brepl,
bsync and recv. Distinguish two cases.
Case 1. A sequence of safe actions of same type. Let us consider the different
safe actions:
‚ Let ρ an execution of Mamplepλ,cpq which consists of only one type of ctrl -
actions:
ρ “ s1 ctrlppkt1,cs1qãÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ s2 ctrlppkt2,cs2qãÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ ...si´1 ctrlppkti´1,csi´1qãÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ si
Suppose ρ is a cycle. According to the ctrl semantics, for each transition
s
ctrlppkt,csqãÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ s1, where s “ ppi, δ, γq, s1 “ ppi1, δ1, γ1q, it holds that γ1.rq “
γ.rqztpktu as we use sets to represent rq buffers. Hence, for the execution
ρ it holds γi.rq “ γ1.rqztpkt1, pkt2, ...pkti´1u which implies that s1 ‰ si.
Contradiction.
‚ Let ρ an execution which consists of only one type of fwd -actions: similar
argument as above since fq-s are represented by sets and thus forward
messages are removed from fq.
‚ Let ρ an execution which consists of only one type of brepl -actions: similar
argument as above since control messages are removed from cq.
‚ Let ρ an execution which consists of only one type of bsync-actions: sim-
ilar argument as above as barrier reply messages are removed from brq-s
that are represented by sets.
‚ Let ρ an execution which consists of only one type of recv -actions: similar
argument as above as packets are removed from rcvq buffers that are
represented by sets.
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Case 2. A sequence of different safe actions. Suppose there exists a cycle with
mixed safe actions starting in s1 and ending in si. Distinguish the following
cases.
i) There exists at least a ctrl and/or a bsync action in the cycle. According
to the effects of safe transitions, the ctrl action will change to a state
with smaller rq and the bsync will always switch to a state with smaller
brq. It is important here that ctrl does not interfere with bsync regarding
rq, brq, and no safe action of other type than ctrl and bsync accesses rq
or brq. This implies that s1 ‰ si. Contradiction.
ii) Neither ctrl, nor bsync actions in the cycle.
a) There is a fwd and/or brepl in the cycle: fwd will always switch to
a state with smaller fq and brepl will always switch to a state with
smaller cq (brepl and recv do not interfere with fwd). This implies
that s1 ‰ si. Contradiction.
b) There is neither fwd nor brepl in the cycle. This means that only recv
is in the cycle which is already covered by the first case.
Due to the definition of the transition system via ample sets, each safe action
is immediately executed after its enabling one. Therefore, one can merge every
transition of a safe action with its precursory enabling one. Intuitively, the seman-
tics of the merged action is defined as the successive execution of its constituent
actions. This process can be repeated if there is a chain of safe actions; for in-
stance, in the case of s
nomatchpsw,pktqãÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ s1 ctrlpsw,pkt,csqãÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ s2 fwdpsw,pkt,portsqãÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ s3
where each transition enables the next and the last two are assumed to be safe.
These transitions can be merged into one, yielding a stutter equivalent trace as
the intermediate states are invisible (w.r.t. the context and thus the property to
be shown) by definition of safe actions.
3.2 State Representation
Efficient state representation is crucial for minimising MOCS’s memory footprint
and enabling it to scale up to relatively large network setups.
Packet and Rule Indexing. In MOCS, only a single instance of each packet
and rule that can appear in the modelled network is kept in memory. An index
is then used to associate queues and flow tables with packets and rules, with a
single bit indicating their presence (or absence). This data structure is illustrated
in Figure 3. For a data packet, a value of 1 in the pq section of the entry indicates
that infinite copies of it are stored in the packet queue of the respective switch. A
value of 1 in the fq section indicates that a single copy of the packet is stored in
the forward queue of the respective switch. A value of 1 in the rq section indicates
that a copy of the packet sent by the respective switch (when a nomatch transition
is fired) is stored in the controller’s request queue. For a rule, a value of 1 in the
ft section indicates that the rule is installed in the respective switch’s flow table.
A value of 1 in the cq section indicates that the rule is part of a FlowMod message
in the respective switch’s control queue.
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Fig. 3: Packet (left) and rule (right) indices
The proposed optimisation enables scaling up the network topology by min-
imising the required memory footprint. For every switch, MOCS only requires a
few bits in each packet and rule entry in the index.
Discovering equivalence classes of packets. Model checking with all possible
packets including all specified fields in the OpenFlow standard would entail a
huge state space that would render any approach unusable. Here, we propose the
discovery of equivalence classes of packets that are then used for model checking.
We first remove all fields that are not referenced in a statement or rule creation
or deletion in the controller program. Then, we identify packet classes that would
result in the same controller behaviour. Currently, as with the rest of literature,
we focus on simple controller programs where such equivalence classes can be
easily identified by analysing static constraints and rule manipulation in the
controller program. We then generate one representative packet from each class
and assign it to all network switches that are directly connected to end-hosts; i.e.
modelling clients that can send an arbitrarily large number of packets in a non-
deterministic fashion. We use the minimum possible number of bits to represent
the identified equivalence classes. For example, if the controller program exerts
different behaviour if the destination tcp port of a packet is 23 (i.e. destined to
an ssh server) or not, we only use a 1-bit field to model this behaviour.
Bit packing. We reduce the size of each recorded state by employing bit packing
using the int type supported by Uppaal, and bit-level operations for the entries
in the packet and rule indices as well as for the packets and rules themselves.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we experimentally evaluate MOCS by comparing it with the state
of the art, in terms of performance (verification throughput and memory foot-
print) and model expressivity. We have implemented MOCS in Uppaal [6] as
a network of parallel automata for the controller and network switches, which
communicate asynchronously by writing/reading packets to/from queues that
are part of the model discussed in §2. As discussed in §3, this is implemented by
directly manipulating the packet and rule indices.
Throughout this section we will be using three examples of network con-
trollers: (1) A stateless firewall (§B-CP1) requires the controller to install rules
to network switches that enable them to decide whether to forward a packet to-
wards its destination or not; this is done in a stateless fashion, i.e. without having
to consider any previously seen packets. For example, a controller could configure
switches to block all packets whose destination port is 22 (i.e. destined to an ssh
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server). (2) A stateful firewall (§B-CP2) is similar to the stateless one but deci-
sions can take into account previously seen packets. A classic example of this is to
allow bi-directional communication between two end-hosts, when one host opens
a tcp connection to the other. Then, traffic flowing from the other host back to
the connection initiator should be allowed to go through the switches on the re-
verse path. (3) A MAC learning application (§B-CP3) enables the controller and
switches to learn how to forward packets to their destinations (identified with
respective MAC addresses). A switch sends a PacketIn message to the controller
when it receives a packet that it does not know how to forward. By looking at
this packet, the controller learns a mapping of a source switch (or host) to a port
of the requesting switch. It then installs a rule (by sending a FlowMod message)
that will allow that switch to forward packets back to the source switch (or host),
and asks the requesting switch (by sending a PacketOut message) to flood the
packet to all its ports except the one it received the packet from. This way, the
controller eventually learns all mappings, and network switches receive rules that
enable them to forward traffic to their neighbours for all destinations in the net-
work.
4.1 Performance Comparison
We measure MOCS’s performance, and also compare it against Kuai [33]5, using
the examples described above, and we investigate the behaviour of MOCS as we
scale up the network (switches and clients/servers). We report three metrics: (1)
verification throughput in visited states per second, (2) number of visited states,
and (3) required memory. We have run all verification experiments on an 18-Core
iMac pro, 2.3GHz Intel Xeon W with 128GB DDR4 memory.
Verification throughput. We measure the verification throughput when run-
ning a single experiment at a time on one cpu core and report the average and
standard deviation for the first 30 minutes of each run. In order to assess how
MOCS’s different optimisations affect its performance, we report results for the
following system variants: (1) MOCS, (2) MOCS without POR, (3) MOCS with-
out any optimisations (neither POR, state representation), and (4) Kuai. Figure 4
shows the measured throughput (with error bars denoting standard deviation).
For the MAC learning and stateless firewall applications, we observe that
MOCS performs significantly better than Kuai for all different network setups
and sizes6, achieving at least double the throughput Kuai does. The throughput
performance is much better for the stateful firewall, too. This is despite the fact
that, for this application, Kuai employs the unrealistic optimisation where the
barrier transition forces the immediate update of the forwarding state. In other
words, MOCS is able to explore significantly more states and identify bugs that
Kuai cannot (see §4.2).
5 Note that parts of Kuai’s source code are not publicly available, therefore we imple-
mented it’s model in Uppaal.
6 SˆH in Figures 4 to 6 indicates the number of switches S and hosts H.
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Fig. 4: Performance Comparison – Verification Throughput
The computational overhead induced by our proposed PORs is minimal. This
overhead occurs when PORs require dynamic checks through the safety predicates
described in Table 1. This is shown in Figure 4a, where, in order to decide about
the (in)visibility of fwd(sw,pk,pt) actions, a lookup is performed in the history-
array of packet pk, checking whether the bit which corresponds to switch sw1,
which is connected with port pt of sw, is set. On the other hand, if a POR does not
require any dynamic checks, no penalty is induced, as shown in Figures 4b and
4c, where the throughput when the PORs are disabled is almost identical to the
case where PORs are enabled. This is because it has been statically established
at a pre-analysis stage that all actions of a particular type are always safe for any
argument/state. It is important to note that even when computational overhead is
induced, PORs enable MOCS to scale up to larger networks because the number
of visited states can be significantly reduced, as discussed below.
In order to assess the contribution of the state representation optimisation in
MOCS’s performance, we measure the throughput when both PORs and state
representation optimisations are disabled. It is clear that they contribute signifi-
cantly to the overall throughput; without these the measured throughput was at
least less than half the throughput when they were enabled.
Number of visited states and required memory. Minimising the number
of visited states and required memory is crucial for scaling up verification to
larger networks. The proposed partial order reductions (§3.1) and identification
of packet equivalent classes aim at the former, while packet/rule indexing and
bit packing aim at the latter (§3.2). In Figure 5, we present the results for the
various setups and network deployments discussed above. We stopped scaling
up the network deployment for each setup when the verification process required
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Fig. 5: Performance Comparison – Visited States (logarithmic scale)
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Fig. 6: Performance Comparison – Memory Footprint (logarithmic scale)
more than 24 hours or started swapping memory to disk. For these cases we killed
the process and report a topped-up bar in Figures 5 and 6.
For the MAC learning application, MOCS can scale up to larger network
deployments compared to Kuai, which could not verify networks consisting of
more than 2 hosts and 6 switches. For that network deployment, Kuai visited
„7m states, whereas MOCS visited only „193k states. At the same time, Kuai
required around 48GBs of memory (7061 bytes/state) whereas MOCS needed
„43MBs (228 bytes/state). Without the partial order reductions, MOCS can
only verify tiny networks. The contribution of the proposed state representation
optimisations is also crucial; in our experiments (results not shown due to lack
of space), for the 6 ˆ 2 network setups (the largest we could do without these
optimisations), we observed a reduction in state space (due to the identification
of packet equivalence classes) and memory footprint (due to packet/rule indexing
and bit packing) from „7m to „200k states and from „6KB per state to „230B
per state. For the stateless and stateful firewall applications, resp., MOCS per-
forms equally well to Kuai with respect to scaling up.
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4.2 Model Expressivity
The proposed model is significantly more expressive compared to Kuai as it al-
lows for more asynchronous concurrency. To begin with, in MOCS, controller
messages sent before a barrier request message can be interleaved with all other
enabled actions, other than the control messages sent after the barrier. By con-
trast, Kuai always flushes all control messages until the last barrier in one go,
masking a large number of interleavings and, potentially, buggy behaviour. Next,
in MOCS nomatch, ctrl and fwd can be interleaved with other actions. In Kuai,
it is enforced a mutual exclusion concurrency control policy through the wait-
semaphore: whenever a nomatch occurs the mutex is locked and it is unlocked by
the fwd action of the thread nomatch-ctrl-fwd which refers to the same packet;
all other threads are forced to wait. Moreover, MOCS does not impose any limit
on the size of the rq queue, in contrast to Kuai where only one packet can exist
in it. In addition, Kuai does not support notifications from the data plane to
the controller for completed operations as it does not support reply messages
and as a result any bug related to the fact that the controller is not synced to
data-plane state changes is hidden.7 Also, our specification language for states is
more expressive than Kuai’s, as we can use any property in LTL without “next”,
whereas Kuai only uses invariants with a single outermost 2.
The MOCS extensions, however, are conservative with respect to Kuai, that is
we have the following theorem (without proof, which is straightforward):
Theorem 3 (MOCS Conservativity). Let Mpλ,cpq “ pS,A, ãÑ, s0, AP, Lq
and MKpλ,cpq “ pSK , AK , ãÑK , s0, AP, Lq the original SDN models of MOCS
and Kuai, respectively, using the same topology and controller. Furthermore, let
TracespMpλ,cpqq and TracespMKpλ,cpqq denote the set of all initial traces in these
models, respectively. Then, TracespMKpλ,cpqq Ď TracespMpλ,cpqq.
For each of the extensions mentioned above, we briefly describe an example (con-
troller program and safety property) that expresses a bug that is impossible to
occur in Kuai.
Control message reordering bug. Let us consider a stateless firewall in
Figure 7a (controller is not shown), which is supposed to block incoming ssh
packets from reaching the server (see §B-CP1). Formally, the safety property to
be checked here is 2p@pkt PS.rcvq . pkt.sshq. Initially, flow tables are empty.
Switch A sends a PacketIn message to the controller when it receives the first
packet from the client (as a result of a nomatch transition). The controller, in
response to this request (and as a result of a ctrl transition), sends the following
FlowMod messages to switch A; rule r1 has the highest priority and drops all
ssh packets, rule r2 sends all packets from port 1 to port 2, and rule r3 sends all
packets from port 2 to port 1. If the packet that triggered the transition above is
an ssh one, the controller drops it, otherwise, it instructs (through a PacketOut
message) A to forward the packet to S. A bug-free controller should ensure that
r1 is installed before any other rule, therefore it must send a barrier request after
7 There are further small extensions; for instance, in MOCS the controller can send
multiple PacketOut messages (as OpenFlow prescribes).
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the FlowMod message that contains r1. If, by mistake, the FlowMod message for
r2 is sent before the barrier request, A may install r2 before r1, which will result
in violating the given property. MOCS is able to capture this buggy behaviour
as its semantics allows control messages prior to the barrier to be processed in a
interleaved manner.
1 2C SA
1 2C SA B1 2
1 2C S
(a)
1 2C SA
1 2C SA B1 2
1 2C S
(b)
Fig. 7: Two networks with (a) two switches, and (b) n stateful firewall replicas
Wrong nesting level bug. Consider a correct controller program that enforces
that server S (Figure 7a) is not accessible through ssh. Formally, the safety
property to be checked here is 2p@pkt PS.rcvq . pkt.sshq. For each incoming
PacketIn message from switch A, it checks if the enclosed packet is an ssh one
and destined to S. If not, it sends a PacketOut message instructing A to forward
the packet to S. It also sends a FlowMod message to A with a rule that allows
packets of the same protocol (not ssh) to reach S. In the opposite case (ssh), it
checks (a Boolean flag) whether it had previously sent drop rules for ssh packets
to the switches. If not, it sets flag to true, sends a FlowMod message with a rule
that drops ssh packets to A and drops the packet. Note that this inner block
does not have an else statement.
A fairly common error is to write a statement at the wrong nesting level (§B-
CP4). Such a mistake can be built into the above program by nesting the outer
else branch in the inner if block, such that it is executed any time an ssh-
packet is encountered but the ssh drop-rule has already been installed (i.e. flag f
is true). Now, the ssh drop rule, once installed in switch A, disables immediately
a potential nomatchpA, pq with p.ssh “ true that would have sent packet p to
the controller, but if it has not yet been installed, a second incoming ssh packet
would lead to the execution of the else statement of the inner branch. This
would violate the property defined above, as p will be forwarded to S8.
MOCS can uncover this bug because of the correct modelling of the controller
request queue and the asynchrony between the concurrent executions of control
messages sent before a barrier. Otherwise, the second packet that triggers the
execution of the wrong branch would not have appeared in the buffer before
the first one had been dealt with by the controller. Furthermore, if all rules in
messages up to a barrier were installed synchronously, the second packet would
be dealt with correctly, so no bug could occur.
Inconsistent update bug. OpenFlow’s barrier and barrier reply mechanisms
allow for updating multiple network switches in a way that enables consistent
packet processing, i.e., a packet cannot see a partially updated network where
8 Here, we assume that the controller looks up a static forwarding table before sending
PacketOut messages to switches.
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only a subset of switches have changed their forwarding policy in response to this
packet (or any other event), while others have not done so. MOCS is expressive
enough to capture this behaviour and related bugs. In the topology shown in
Figure 7a, let us assume that, by default, switch B drops all packets destined to S.
Any attempt to reach S through A are examined separately by the controller and,
when granted access, a relevant rule is installed at both switches (e.g. allowing
all packets from C destined to S for given source and destination ports). Updates
must be consistent, therefore the packet cannot be forwarded by A and dropped
by B. Both switches must have the new rules in place, before the packet is
forwarded. To do so, the controller, (§B-CP5), upon receiving a PacketIn message
from the client’s switch, sends the relevant rule to switch B (FlowMod) along with
respective barrier (BarrierReq) and temporarily stores the packet that triggered
this update. Only after receiving BarrierRes message from B, the controller will
forward the previously stored packet back to A along with the relevant rule. This
update is consistent and the packet is guaranteed to reach S. A (rather common)
bug would be one where the controller installs the rules to both switches and at
the same time forwards the packet to A. In this case, the packet may end up
being dropped by B, if it arrives and gets processed before the relevant rule is
installed, and therefore the invariant 2`rdropppkt, swqs . ppkt.dest “ Sq˘, where
rdropppkt, swqs is a quantifier that binds dropped packets (see definition in §B-
CP5), would be violated. For this example, it is crucial that MOCS supports
barrier response messages.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that an OpenFlow compliant SDN model, with the right optimi-
sations, can be model checked to discover subtle real-world bugs. We proved that
MOCS can capture real-world bugs in a more complicated semantics without
sacrificing performance.
But this is not the end of the line. One could automatically compute equiva-
lence classes of packets that cover all behaviours (where we still computed man-
ually). To what extent the size of the topology can be restricted to find bugs in
a given controller is another interesting research question, as is the analysis of
the number and length of interleavings necessary to detect certain bugs. In our
examples, all bugs were found in less than a second.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 21
References
1. Al-Fares, M., Radhakrishnan, S., Raghavan, B.: Hedera: Dynamic Flow Scheduling
for Data Center Networks. In: NSDI (2010).
2. Al-Shaer, E., Al-Haj, S.: FlowChecker: Configuration analysis and verification of
federated OpenFlow infrastructures. In: SafeConfig (2010).
3. Albert, E., Go´mez-Zamalloa, M., Rubio, A., et al.: SDN-Actors: Modeling and
verification of SDN programs. In: FM (2018).
4. Baier, C., Katoen, J.P.: Principles Of Model Checking, vol. 950 (2008).
5. Ball, T., Bjørner, N., Gember, A., et al.: VeriCon: Towards Verifying Controller
Programs in Software-defined Networks. In: PLDI (2014).
6. Behrmann, G., David, A., Larsen, K.G., et al.: Developing UPPAAL over 15 years.
Software: Practice and Experience (2011).
7. Braga, R., Mota, E., Passito, A.: Lightweight DDoS flooding attack detection using
NOX/OpenFlow. In: LCN (2010).
8. Canini, M., Venzano, D., Peresˇ´ıni, P., et al.: A NICE Way to Test Openflow Appli-
cations. In: NSDI (2012).
9. Cimatti, A., Clarke, E., Giunchiglia, E., et al.: NuSMV 2: An OpenSource Tool for
Symbolic Model Checking (2002).
10. Curtis, A.R., Mogul, J.C., Tourrilhes, J., et al.: DevoFlow: scaling flow management
for high-performance networks. SIGCOMM (2011).
11. Dobrescu, M., Argyraki, K.: Software dataplane verification. Communications of
the ACM (2015).
12. El-Hassany, A., Tsankov, P., Vanbever, L., et al.: Network-wide configuration syn-
thesis. In: CAV (2017).
13. Fayaz, S.K., Sharma, T., Fogel, A., et al.: Efficient Network Reachability Analysis
Using a Succinct Control Plane Representation. In: OSDI (2016).
14. Fayaz, S.K., Yu, T., Tobioka, Y., et al.: BUZZ: Testing Context-Dependent Policies
in Stateful Networks. In: NSDI (2016).
15. Feamster, N., Rexford, J., Shenker, S., et al.: SDX: A software-defined Internet
exchange. Open Networking Summit (2013).
16. Fischer, M.J., Ladner, R.E.: Propositional dynamic logic of regular programs. Jour-
nal of Computer and System Sciences (1979).
17. Fogel, A., Fung, S., Angeles, L., et al.: A General Approach to Network Configura-
tion Analysis. NSDI (2015).
18. Handigol, N., Seetharaman, S., Flajslik, M., et al.: Plug-n-Serve: Load-balancing
web traffic using OpenFlow. SIGCOMM (2009).
19. Havelund, K., Pressburger, T.: Model checking JAVA programs using JAVA
PathFinder. STTT (2000).
20. Holzmann, G.J.: The model checker SPIN. IEEE Transactions on Software Engi-
neering (1997).
21. Holzmann, G.J., Peled, D.: An Improvement in Formal Verification. In: FORTE
(1994).
22. Horn, A., Kheradmand, A., Prasad, M.R.: Delta-net: Real-time Network Verifica-
tion Using Atoms. In: NSDI (2017).
23. Hu, H., Ahn, G.J., Han, W., et al.: Towards a Reliable SDN Firewall. In: ONS
(2014).
24. Jackson, D.: Alloy: A lightweight object modelling notation. ACM Transactions on
Software Engineering and Methodology (2002).
25. Jafarian, J.H., Al-Shaer, E., Duan, Q.: OpenFlow random host mutation: Transpar-
ent moving target defense using software defined networking. In: HotSDN (2012).
22 V. Klimis, G. Parisis, and B. Reus
26. Jain, S., Zhu, M., Zolla, J., et al.: B4: Experience with a Globally-Deployed Software
Defined WAN. In: SIGCOMM (2013).
27. Jia, Y.: NetSMC : A Symbolic Model Checker for Stateful Network Verification. In:
NSDI (2020).
28. Kazemian, P., Chang, M., Zeng, H., et al.: Real Time Network Policy Checking
Using Header Space Analysis. In: NSDI (2013).
29. Kazemian, P., Varghese, G., McKeown, N.: Header space analysis: Static checking
for networks. In: NSDI (2012).
30. Khurshid, A., Zou, X., Zhou, W., et al.: VeriFlow: Verifying Network-wide Invari-
ants in Real Time. In: NSDI (2013).
31. Li, Y., Yin, X., Wang, Z., et al.: A survey on network verification and testing with
formal methods: Approaches and challenges. IEEE Surveys & Tutorials (2019).
32. Mai, H., Khurshid, A., Agarwal, R., et al.: Debugging the data plane with anteater.
In: SIGCOMM (2011).
33. Majumdar, R., Deep Tetali, S., Wang, Z.: Kuai: A model checker for software-
defined networks. In: FMCAD (2014).
34. McClurg, J., Hojjat, H., Cˇerny´, P., et al.: Efficient synthesis of network updates.
In: PLDI (2015).
35. McKeown, N., Anderson, T., Balakrishnan, H., et al.: OpenFlow: Enabling Innova-
tion in Campus Networks. SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev. (2008).
36. ONF: Software-defined networking: The new norm for networks. ONF White Paper
(2012).
37. ONF: SDN Architecture Overview. Technical Report (2013), https://tinyurl.
com/kl5gd5m.
38. Patel, P., Bansal, D., Yuan, L., et al.: Ananta: Cloud Scale Load Balancing. SIG-
COMM (2013).
39. Peled, D.: All from one, one for all: on model checking using representatives. In:
CAV (1993).
40. Plotkin, G.D., Bjørner, N., Lopes, N.P., et al.: Scaling network verification using
symmetry and surgery. In: POPL (2016).
41. Pnueli, A., Xu, J., Zuck, L.: Liveness with (0, 1, 8)-counter abstraction. In: CAV
(2002).
42. Pratt, V.R.: Semantical considerations on Floyd-Hoare logic. In: FOCS (1976).
43. Sethi, D., Narayana, S., Malik, S.: Abstractions for model checking SDN controllers.
In: FMCAD (2013).
44. Shenker, S., Casado, M., Koponen, T., et al.: The future of networking, and the
past of protocols. In: ONS (2011), https://tinyurl.com/yxnuxobt.
45. Son, S., Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., et al.: Model checking invariant security prop-
erties in OpenFlow. In: IEEE (2013).
46. Stoenescu, R., Popovici, M., Negreanu, L., et al.: SymNet: Scalable symbolic exe-
cution for modern networks. In: SIGCOMM (2016).
47. Varghese, G.: Vision for Network Design Automation and Network Verification. In:
NetPL (Talk) (2018), https://tinyurl.com/y2cnhvhf.
48. Yang, H., Lam, S.S.: Real-time verification of network properties using atomic pred-
icates. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (2016).
49. Zeng, H., Kazemian, P., Varghese, G., et al.: A Survey on Network Troubleshooting.
Technical Report TR12-HPNG-061012, Stanford University (2012).
50. Zeng, H., Zhang, S., Ye, F., et al.: Libra: Divide and Conquer to Verify Forwarding
Tables in Huge Networks. In: NSDI (2014).
51. Zhang, S., Malik, S.: SAT based verification of network data planes. In: Automated
Technology for Verification and Analysis. Springer (2013).
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 23
A Safeness
Lemma 1 (Safeness). For an SDN network modelMpλ,cpq “ pS,A, ãÑ, s0, AP, Lq
and context ctx “ pcp, λ, ϕq with ϕ P LTLzt©u,
α P A is safe ðñ
ľ3
i“1 Safeipαq
where Safei are given in Table 1.
Proof. To show safety we need to show two properties: independence (of any
other action) and invisibility w.r.t. the context, in particular controller program,
topology function and formula ϕ.
Independence: Recall that two actions α and β ‰ α are independent iff for any
state s such that α P Apsq and β P Apsq:
1. α P Apβpsqq and β P Apαpsqq
2. αpβpsqq “ βpαpsqq
(1): It can be easily checked that no safe action disables any other action, nor is
any safe action disabled by any other action, so the first condition of independence
holds.
(2): For any safe action α and any other action β we can assume already that
they meet Condition (1). Let us perform a case analysis on α:
§ α is either brepl, recv or fwd :
To show that any interleaving with any action β ‰ α leads to the same state,
we observe that the changes of packet queues by these actions do not interfere
with each other. In cases where a packet is removed from a queue by α (e.g.
α “ recvph, pktq removes from h.rcvq) but then inserted into the same queue
by β (e.g. β “ fwdpsw, pkt, portsq where h P λpsw, portsq), there is no conflict
either, as both actions must have been enabled in the original state in the
first place. So no conflicts arise for those α.
§ α is ctrlpsw, pkt, csq:
‚ If β is not a ctrl or bsync action, then the same argument as above holds.
‚ The interesting cases occur when β is in tctrlp¨q, bsyncp¨qu. From Safe2pαq
we know that cp is not order-sensitive, which implies that α and β are
independent. Order-insensitivity is a relatively strong condition but it
ensures correctness of the lemma and thus partial order reduction.9 Thus
any interleaving of α and β leads to the same state.
§ α is bsyncpsw, xid, csq.
The same line of argument applies as for ctrlpsw, pkt, csq, simply exchanging
the roles of α and β.
9 Generalisations by a more clever analysis of the controller program are a future
research topic.
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Invisibility : We show this for all safe actions separately:
‚ α “ ctrlpsw, pk, csq. The only variables α can change are the controller.rq,
sw.fq and the control state cs. The first two can not appear in ϕ due to the
definition of the specification language. In case the control state changes, α
is invisible to ϕ because Safe3pαq in Table 1.
‚ α “ bsyncpsw, xid, csq. This α only affects brq, sw.fq, sw1.cq for some switches
sw1, and the control state cs. We know by definition of Specification Lan-
guage (§2.4) that it cannot refer to brq or any sw1.cq. In case the control
state changes, α is invisible to ϕ because Safe3pαq in Table 1.
‚ α “ fwdpsw, pk, portsq. Assumption Safe3pαq in Table 1 guarantees that the
only variables α can change, i.e. D.pq or D.rcvq for any D in λpsw, pq1 | p P
ports and sw.pq, actually remain unchanged. Thus it follows by definition
that α is invisible to ϕ.
‚ α “ breplpsw, xidq. Since, by definition of Specification Language (§2.4), the
atomic propositions refer neither to any cq nor brq, it follows from the effect
of α that only affects sw.cq and brq that any breplp¨q is always invisible.
‚ α “ recvph, pkq. Assumption Safe3pαq in Table 1 guarantees that ϕ does
not refer to h.rcvq, which is the only variable affected by α, and therefore
recvph, pkq is invisible to ϕ.
B Controller Programs
1 handler pktIn(sw, pkt):
2 if not pkt.SSH then // Otherwise, pkt is dropped silently
3 send_message
`
PacketOut(pkt, 2), sw
˘
4 end
5 rule1Ð  {prioÐ 10}, {SSH Ð 1 }, {in_portÐ *}, {fwd_portÐ drop}(
6 rule2Ð  {prioÐ 1}, {SSH Ð * }, {in_portÐ 1}, {fwd_portÐ 2 }( // asterisk (*) matches any value
7 rule3Ð  {prioÐ 1}, {SSH Ð * }, {in_portÐ 2}, {fwd_portÐ 1 }(
8 forall s P Switches do // Switches is the set of all switches
9 send_message
`
FlowMod
`
add(rule2)
˘
, s
˘
10 send_message
`
FlowMod
`
add(rule1)
˘
, s
˘
11 send_message
`
BarrierReq
`
b_id
˘
, s
˘
// b_id is a barrier identifier
12 send_message
`
FlowMod
`
add(rule3)
˘
, s
˘
13 end
Controller Program CP1: A stateless firewall filter with control messages reordering bug. In a bug-free program (the
one we used to verify in §4), rule1 should be sent first and followed by a barrier. Property: “neither host should be
accessed over ssh”. Formally, 2`@h PHosts @pkt Ph.rcvq . pkt.sshq.
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1 handler pktIn(sw, pkt):
2 if allowed_conn[pkt.src][pkt.src_TCP_port][pkt.dest][pkt.dest_TCP_port] then /* allowed_conn is a fixed
a * whitelist of TCP
a * socket connections
a * (host, TCP_port) ÞÑ
a * (host, TCP_port)
a */
3 send_message
`
PacketOut(pkt, 2), sw
˘
4 rule1.src Ð pkt.src
5 rule1.src_TCP_port Ð pkt.src_TCP_port
6 rule1.dest Ð pkt.dest
7 rule1.dest_TCP_portÐ pkt.dest_TCP_port
8 rule1.fwd_port Ð 2
9 rule1.prio Ð 2
10 rule2.src Ð pkt.dest
11 rule2.src_TCP_port Ð pkt.dest_TCP_port
12 rule2.dest Ð pkt.src
13 rule2.dest_TCP_portÐ pkt.src_TCP_port
14 rule2.fwd_port Ð 1
15 rule2.prio Ð 2
16 forall s P Switches do // access rules are uniform across all switches, any of which acting as firewall replica
17 send_message
`
FlowMod
`
add(rule1)
˘
, s
˘
18 send_message
`
FlowMod
`
add(rule2)
˘
, s
˘
19 send_message
`
BarrierReq
`
b_id
˘
, s
˘
// b_id is uniquely associated with an allowed connection
20 end
21 else
22 send_message
`
PacketOut(pkt, drop), sw
˘
23 drop_rule.src Ð pkt.src
24 drop_rule.src_TCP_port Ð pkt.src_TCP_port
25 drop_rule.dest Ð pkt.dest
26 drop_rule.dest_TCP_portÐ pkt.dest_TCP_port
27 drop_rule.fwd_port Ð drop
28 drop_rule.prio Ð 1
29 forall s P Switches do
30 send_message
`
FlowMod
`
add(drop_rule)
˘
, s
˘
// access restrictions are uniform across all replicas
31 end
32 end
33
34 handler barrierIn(sw, xid):
35 controller_view[b_id][sw] Ð true /* controller_view associates installed rules (through the respective b_id)
a * for respective allowed connections with switches
a */
Controller Program CP2: Stateful inspection firewall (Figure 7b). The property we verify is: “a packet is never
dropped by a rule in a switch if the controller is aware of a matching rule being already installed in this switch”.
Formally: 2´rdropmppkt, swqs controller viewrpkt.srcsrpkt.src TCP portsrpkt.destsrpkt.dest TCP portsrsws¯
where rdropmppkt, swqsP is short for rmatchpsw, pkt, rqspr.fwd ports “ drop^ Pq.
1 handler pktIn(sw, pkt):
2 if not MAC_table[sw][pkt.src] then // MAC_table associates sender with a switch port
3 MAC_table[sw][pkt.src] Ð pkt.in_port
4 end
5 if MAC_table[sw][pkt.dest] then
6 send_message
`
PacketOut(pkt, MAC_table[sw][pkt.dest]), sw
˘
7 rule.src Ð pkt.src
8 rule.dest Ð pkt.dest
9 rule.in_port Ð pkt.in_port
10 rule.fwd_portÐ MAC_table[sw][pkt.dest]
11 rule.prio Ð 1
12 send_message
`
FlowMod
`
add(rule)
˘
, sw
˘
13 else
14 send_message
`
PacketOut(pkt, flood\{pkt.in_port}), sw˘ // pkt will be flooded to all ports except incoming one
15 end
Controller Program CP3: MAC learning application
:
for verifying absence of loops. In order to keep track of the
network devices the packet passes through (i.e. the packet path history), the packet type is augmented with a history
bit-field reached where each bit represents a visited/unvisited switch. As packets are being flooded, their history bit-field
is re-written. The loop freedom property asserts that “a packet should not come back to the same switch”. Formally,2`@sw PSwitches @pkt P sw.pq . pkt.reachedrsws˘.
:
https://github.com/noxrepo/pox/blob/412a6adb38cb646748c8cfb657549787ab6d2e88/pox/forwarding/l2_learning.py
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1 handler pktIn(sw, pkt):
2 if pkt.SSH and pkt.dest == S then
3 if not f then // f is initialised as false. pkt is dropped silently
4 f Ð true
5 drop_rule.prio Ð 1
6 drop_rule.SSH Ð pkt.SSH
7 drop_rule.dest Ð pkt.dest
8 drop_rule.fwd_portÐ drop
9 forall s P Switches do
10 send_message
`
FlowMod
`
add(drop_rule)
˘
, s
˘
11 send_message
`
BarrierReq
`
b_id
˘
, s
˘
// b_id is a barrier identifier
12 end
13 else
14 send_message
`
PacketOut(pkt, 2), sw
˘
15 rule.prio Ð 2
16 rule.SSH Ð pkt.SSH
17 rule.dest Ð pkt.dest
18 rule.fwd_portÐ 2
19 forall s P Switches do
20 send_message
`
FlowMod
`
add(rule)
˘
, s
˘
21 end
22 end
23 else
24 ...
25 end
Controller Program CP4: Wrong nesting level bug: Executing the else-branch - shaded red - would violate the
policy that “server S (Figure 7a) should not be accessed over ssh”, 2p@pkt PS.rcvq . pkt.sshq.
1 handler pktIn(sw, pkt): // Assumption: a drop-all rule with priority 0 is installed in switch B (Fig.7a)
2 if pkt.dest == S and BarrierRes(b_id) not received then /* b_id is uniquely associated with rule_S which
a * overrides the drop-all entry at B, and
a * allows packets to be forwarded to S through
a * port 2
a */
3 if not packets_held[sw][pkt] then /* packets_held is temporarily storing packets sent by B until consistent
a * update is complete a a
a a a */
4 packets_held[sw][pkt] Ð true
5 rule_SÐ  {destÐ S}, {fwd_portÐ 2}, {prioÐ 2}(
6 send_message
`
FlowMod
`
add(rule_S)
˘
, B
˘
7 send_message
`
BarrierReq
`
b_id
˘
, B
˘
8 end
9 else
10 send_message
`
PacketOut(pkt, 2), sw
˘
11 end
12
13 handler barrierIn(sw, xid):
14 if xid == b_id then
15 rule_SÐ  {destÐ S}, {fwd_portÐ 2}, {prioÐ 2}(
16 forall s P Switches\{B} do // all switches except B
17 send_message
`
FlowMod
`
add(rule_S)
˘
, s
˘
18 end
19 while packets_held[swi][p] for some (p, swi) and p.dest == S do
20 packets_held[swi][p] Ð false // swi is the switch packet p was sent from
21 send_message
`
PacketOut(p, 2), swi
˘
22 end
23 end
Controller Program CP5: Consistent updates. We verify the property that “a packet destined to server S is
never dropped at any switch”. Formally: 2`rdropmf ppkt, swqs ppkt.dest “ Sq˘, where rdropmf ppkt, swqsP is short for
rmatchpsw, pkt, rqspr.fwd ports “ drop^ Pq _ rfwdpsw, pkt, fwd portsqspfwd ports “ drop^ Pq.
